A liberal democracy can survive for a while on institutional strength and widespread agreement. As long as most people are generally satisfied with how things are going (or have made peace with the status quo), it is easy to imagine that something like a social contract will keep things on track. Hamish MacAuley makes a persuasive case that many Canadians came of age politically between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 2008 financial crisis, when consensus was widespread and politics seemed optional, thus many chose to stay out. We abandoned democratic governing habits during prosperous times. Instead, we played politics. In response, McGill's Jacob T. Levy advocates for political action that rejects the status quo while also refusing to burn it all down or take our ball and go home. We should participate in politics, even if it is unsatisfying. When the foundations of our democratic structure or the rights of vulnerable people are jeopardized, it makes sense to delegate aut
The casual exchange of regulatory policies and experiences between producing states is a common occurrence in the petroleum industry's upstream sector. For unitization and offshore decommissioning, the operations whose regulations will be examined in this thesis, similar rules exist in several producing countries, which can be explained in part by the use of rules from other countries in the construction of another country's reg. However, even when state actors create foreign regulations, those rules cannot be considered national rules because they exist outside of the country's legal system that adopts them. And they can't even be called international rules, y'know?Because they were not created by the country that uses them as a reference, fam. So, in this thesis, we're discussing how foreign regulation resembles transnational rules, you know?
Features of the Upstream Sector of the Petroleum Industry's Transnational Legal Order
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Yo, after laying out the entire TLO for the upstream sector, the following sections will break it down with the elements, attributes, and characteristics that Halliday and Shaffer (2015) used to determine whether a TLO exists. OMG, under this regime, the operator is completely liable for damages, even if they were caused by the service companies they hired, unless it is damage to others caused by negligence or failure to do their job properly. This is because the operator is solely responsible for designing the development of E&P activities, contracting for goods and services, and monitoring the performance of contracted service companies. Furthermore, the operator decides which equipment and standards to use, as well as how to carry out each stage of the field development project. Periodt. So, like, the risk is mostly assigned to the party that can completely control and prevent those risks, you know? The Safety Case is essentially a highly visible risk management system designed to prevent accidents. It has been adopted by the North Sea, Australia, and New Zealand, family. OMG, in this system, the operator is completely responsible for identifying potential risks to the operation and presenting the regulator with a plan to avoid them via a lit risk management structure.
According to the author, family
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According to Hopkins (2012), one important aspect of the safety case system is the operator's duty to reduce risks to "as low as reasonably practicable," also known as the ALARP principle or the performance standard, as suggested by Weaver (2014). So, like, the operator has to be all about taking reasonable and effective precautions, you know? That is, the level of forecast risk and the costs of mitigating those risks should not be completely out of balance. Ion this. OMG, the operator will be held fully responsible if the regulator discovers that they could have completely avoided the damages. Another important point to make about the safety case is that this system is all about that performance-based vibe, you know? Operators have complete freedom to choose the industry practices that they believe are most efficient. There are almost no references in the regulation to the rules that must be followed, as in the prescriptive model. OMG, just like Bunter (2012) says, the safety case in the North Sea is lit! It's all about results and principles, and the petroleum companies are fully committed to fostering a safety culture.
Self-regulation and ethics are the name of the game, family!
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According to OMG and Weaver (2017), codes of conduct are compilations of industry practices that serve as consulting material for both petroleum companies and regulators in terms of operational performance and monitoring. So lit, right? These codes appear to have been created by a group of people from various backgrounds, including businesses, hospitals, non-governmental organizations, local communities, and international organizations. It's all about the collaborative process, you know? So, it's all about helping to identify industry practices and their origins by demonstrating what works best in each situation. They're also a way for member companies of industry associations to demonstrate their commitment to the industry, ya know? F. Ost and M. Kerchove (2002) define industry codes of conduct as companies attempting to flex their self-regulation skills and fill in the gaps in business law, ya know? For them, the goal of these codes is to flex on management, maintain control, and protect the minority shareholders. This system includes employees who are completely involved in the operation and may be targeted by regulators during the auditing process. Hopkins (2012) completely agrees that the safety case is a legitimate case - an argument presented to the regulator, you know? As a result, operators must demonstrate to regulators the practices they use to manage risks, as well as explain why they use them.
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