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Event Planning and Business Entertainment in the U.S. Corporate World

A liberal democracy can survive for a while on institutional strength and widespread agreement. As long as most people are generally satisfied with how things are going (or have made peace with the status quo), it is easy to imagine that something like a social contract will keep things on track. Hamish MacAuley makes a persuasive case that many Canadians came of age politically between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 2008 financial crisis, when consensus was widespread and politics seemed optional, thus many chose to stay out. We abandoned democratic governing habits during prosperous times. Instead, we played politics. In response, McGill's Jacob T. Levy advocates for political action that rejects the status quo while also refusing to burn it all down or take our ball and go home. We should participate in politics, even if it is unsatisfying. When the foundations of our democratic structure or the rights of vulnerable people are jeopardized, it makes sense to delegate aut

The U.S.-Canada Relationship in International Organizations

The vibes created by these authors and that make up the TLO for the upstream sector are all about legal vibes in recognizable legal forms, both hard and soft law, which include: the rules that are like, totally binding and the E&P contracts that are drafted within the HCs; the model contracts that are produced by industry associations; codes of conduct and guidelines that are issued by IGOs, international NGOs and like, informal connecting networks; industry practices that are produced by industry associations and international NGOs; and contractual clauses that are all about consolidating risk allocation models produced by HCs or industry associations.

Transnash


Yo, like, the TLO norms for the upstream sector are totally adopted in all the HCs where they do upstream stuff. It's all about ordering relationships that go beyond country boundaries, you know? OMG, like having a Transnational Legal Org or Network is lit AF! The first thing Halliday and Shaffer (2015) say to qualify TLO is that it needs a legit org or network that goes beyond countries' boundaries in making the rules. The level of the legal org or network's formality can vary hella. Netz, like industry assoz, are way more chill, while IOGs are like super formal.
Transnational rules can also pop off from the replication of norms that are part of a lit nation-state's national legal order. Or norms can be developed by parties or private networks through a bottom-up process, like norms formulated by companies, industry associations, or NGOs in order to be incorporated or recognized and required by other countries. Periodt. However, these standards will only be legit and have clout when they're drafted with the help of international or transnational networks and orgs. TLO, anyone? So like, these networks and orgs will totally be in the mix when it comes to forming, convincing, and maybe even making these norms official. They'll help with all the talking, understanding, keeping an eye on things, and making sure the rules are followed, even if they need to be changed or settled in court. Michaels (2016) totally roasts this attribute cuz he gets that what makes a TLO cool is the scope of its rules, so if we make transnational rules, it would make institutions transnational, not the other way around. So, like, for this author, an institution could be considered transnational if it's all about producing transnational standards, ya know? 

Like, based on this logic, the state would totally be, like, a transnational institution, you know?


OMG, when it comes to the upstream sector, you can totally see this transnational legal org lowkey flexing its influence on the national level. They be all up in the drafting of norms for the upstream sector regulatory system of each HC. Like, for real, HCs be copying the same E&P contracts as other HCs, you know?
Yo, at the international and transnational level, this attribute is like totally seen when norms are made by IGOs, international NGOs, oil industry associations, and like informal networks of regulators. And like, they all do their thing across different countries, you know? Yo, the contracts between operators, non-operators, and service companies are like made by industry associations, you know? They're all drafted by those cool peeps mentioned in section 1.2.2. The industry practices are like developed by a bunch of actors who make up this global legal network, you feel me? It's all formed by non-state players and stuff. yo, so we got these actors, right? like operators, service companies, and industry associations. and then we got some public actors too, like IGOs, regulators, and the Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway. oh, and there's also regulators' networks, like the International Regulators' Forum for Global Offshore Safety (IRF). Risk allocation models are also designed by petro industry associations, fam. OMG, like, the knock-for-knock model is all about the IADC and the International Marine Contractors Association teaming up to make it happen, according to Cameron (2013). So lit! When it comes to the safety case model, the International Regulators Forum for Global Offshore Safety (IRF) can be seen as a lit transnational network that chats and spreads this model. yo, they be makin' codes of conduct for the upstream sector, ya know? IGOs, international NGOs, oil companies, and industry associations be all up in it.

Legal Institutions be flexin' in multiple nation-states, ya feel me?


The second TLO attribute Halliday and Shaffer (2015) flexed on is all about how legal institutions are getting involved in adopting, recognizing, and enforcing transnational rules in different countries, whether they do it directly or indirectly, officially or casually. Although the concept of law is like, way broader in TLO, it's not totally disconnected from positivist doctrine, ya know? The state stays hella important when it comes to making rules, ya know? Recognizing and demanding it helps organize the whole process, fam. OMG, like according to Abbott and Snidal (2009), the state can totally flex its power in making transnational rules and bringing them into our national legal system. Lit!
So, TLO gotta like, totally vibe with the national legal order somehow. This can be thru influencin' the content of transnational rules on the draftin' of domestic statutes, regs, and their interpretations, or by incorporatin' transnational rules into national contracts, like referencin' standards created by private international standard-settin' bodies like the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). OMG, like, the national legal order totally includes private rule-making processes, ya know? And these norms, like, they're made by private transnational institutions, but then states are all like, "Yeah, we're gonna include these in our legislation, contracts, and court decisions." It's all about stuff like fair-trade labels and industry practices, you feel me? When talking about how legal stuff works in different countries, Michaels (2016) says that this whole thing shouldn't be seen as a way to keep TLO's state law out. He's like, when a rule from one country's legal stuff gets copied by another country, it's like, the national vibes are there, you know?

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