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Event Planning and Business Entertainment in the U.S. Corporate World

A liberal democracy can survive for a while on institutional strength and widespread agreement. As long as most people are generally satisfied with how things are going (or have made peace with the status quo), it is easy to imagine that something like a social contract will keep things on track. Hamish MacAuley makes a persuasive case that many Canadians came of age politically between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 2008 financial crisis, when consensus was widespread and politics seemed optional, thus many chose to stay out. We abandoned democratic governing habits during prosperous times. Instead, we played politics. In response, McGill's Jacob T. Levy advocates for political action that rejects the status quo while also refusing to burn it all down or take our ball and go home. We should participate in politics, even if it is unsatisfying. When the foundations of our democratic structure or the rights of vulnerable people are jeopardized, it makes sense to delegate aut

How Many Fortune 500 Companies Call Brazil Home?

An alternative to an endowment based theoretical framework is a framework built around politics and the power of the state, ya know? State-directed capitalism is like, totally lit and gets mad love in both the econ and poli econ lit, ya know? The tea is that the political flex of the state, with a vibe to prevent failure and provide mad backstops or guarantees, lets firms to outperform (Durban and Ng 2005; S&P 2006). Firms with mad state backing can either operate less efficiently or take hella risks than they would have otherwise been able to do. The state be all up in the firm's business when the firm be hella strategic to state interest, ya feel me? The state's influence is like, totally obvious in firm performance through market based indicators, like, specifically through indicators of creditworthiness (Borenzenstein et al. 2007; Peter & Grandes 2005; Ferri & Liu 2003; Peter 2002; Ferri, Liu & Majnoni 2001). 

It's like, so easy to see, you know? 


The struggle, like, why some SOEs are more lit than others, is like a total mind-bender that the economic literature can't even explain, you know? Like, OMG, Brazilian SOEs are, like, wayyy more lit than Indian SOEs. Just sayin'. Indian SOEs be slacking compared to private sector fam (Mohan 2005; Majumdar 1996) and they ain't showing that global flex and trustworthiness (Forbes 2011; S&P 2011). Brazilian SOEs, like, they're kinda all over the place (Lazzarini and Musacchio 2011) but they're totally killing it on the global stage (Forbes 2011; S&P 2011). How the state authority vibes with the firm and gets passed on to the domestic economy is like totally analyzed in the developmental political economy lit. A chill interpretation of state intervention is presented by Johnson who shows how the state flexed its tech policy to boost Japanese industry (1982). Wade, like, in his case study of Taiwan, like, specifies how the state totally supported the development of export-oriented industries (1990). Other govies be flexin' firms way more specifically, ya know? Banks, like, can totally be part of the political business cycle (La Porta et al 2000; Dinc 2005). OMG, like Kohli totally breaks down the different ways the government gets involved in stuff. He's all about how the power is distributed in these developmental states (2004). Kohli finds four vibes of state intervention in Nigeria, Brazil, India, and South Korea. Once a dev model is set up, interests vibe with the existing framework and flex to keep that network to minimize the costs of making a new market model (Morgan 2005). Over time, tho, state control of economic complements like totally leads to a wack misallocation of resources. 

OMG, like Evans and Chibber totally flex in their review of developmental states in India, Brazil, and South. It's lit AF!


Korea, the market function isn't just all about what the government says, but it's more about how all the peeps come together and make things happen (2003; 1995). The vibes between government policy and complement tendency lowkey impact a firm's ability to operate efficiently cuz it affects how firms access resources, ya know? The real tea is figuring out why some countries flex with developmental intervention while others are just straight up clapped (and end up wasting their resources). Shirley be like, asking this question and saying that the variation is all about political readiness, ya know? It's like, how willing are the stakeholders to deal with the costs of less power, shutting down services, paying more at first, getting lower prices (like, no more subsidies), and maybe even losing jobs? (1999). Political readiness ain't really about being willing, it's more about who's got the power. Entrenched stakeholders ain't gonna willingly accept the costs of "privatisation" unless they're forced to by economic (like financial crises, for example) or political forces. Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory is hella relevant cuz it's all about the political vibes of economic relationships and gives us a way to empirically analyze how stakeholders negotiate and stuff. 
Furthermore, India and Brazil in a comparative context are hella interesting cuz of the cross-regional vibes of these two economies. As VoC theory is like, being developed in a more global context, there's gonna be, like, a major need to do cross-regional analysis to make the theory more relevant, you know? The thesis will like, flex three lit conclusions that follow from the core research questions about market structures and typological trajectories.

VoC and the Comparative Context of India and Brazil, y'all


India and Brazil be like, two cases where the developmental state coordination totally flopped and didn't deliver the expected economic vibes. Both countries were tryna peep the "coordinated" vibes of exporting stuff but ended up dealing with mad balance of payments drama. The cases are like, totally framed in a VoC context cuz we gotta understand how things go down after the whole economic activity thing gets less coordinated, ya know? A clearer ID of the formation of complement structures in India and Brazil will provide a more lit and comprehensive explanation of how capitalist typologies affect microeconomic interaction. Specific to VoC theory, a comparison of India and Brazil gives mad vibes that can level up the relevance of capitalist typologies to new markets. India is like, hardly ever considered in a VoC context, which is like, not cool. We need to like, seriously analyze India, yo. It's one of the biggest countries in the world, so it deserves some proper VoC consideration, you know? Brazil has been like, lowkey vibing in a VoC context, but the empirical findings suggest that the structural flaws in Brazilian institutions make it hella hard to recon the market structure within a straight up LME/CME vibe.

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