A liberal democracy can survive for a while on institutional strength and widespread agreement. As long as most people are generally satisfied with how things are going (or have made peace with the status quo), it is easy to imagine that something like a social contract will keep things on track. Hamish MacAuley makes a persuasive case that many Canadians came of age politically between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 2008 financial crisis, when consensus was widespread and politics seemed optional, thus many chose to stay out. We abandoned democratic governing habits during prosperous times. Instead, we played politics. In response, McGill's Jacob T. Levy advocates for political action that rejects the status quo while also refusing to burn it all down or take our ball and go home. We should participate in politics, even if it is unsatisfying. When the foundations of our democratic structure or the rights of vulnerable people are jeopardized, it makes sense to delegate aut
From a distance, Brazil and India appear to share many similarities, including SOEs, labor laws, underdeveloped capital markets, and institutional instability. It's typical for developing countries, you know? However, when the details are compared, it is clear how different these two markets are. There are significant differences in how firms increase productivity in the microeconomy, whether complements are created or not, and how typological trajectories may not always align with liberal market norms. The need to completely understand market dynamics at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels is critical for understanding an economy's structures, you know?
Summary, Family
.jpg)
The primary goals of the thesis are to determine the various paths that capitalists take and why the most competitive EM firms differ in each market. VoC, you know, provides an analytical foundation for linking domestic political and economic institutional structures to firm performance. Economic and political explanations are insufficient to explain why firms in the same sector behave so differently in different markets. An institutional/VoC approach demonstrates how incentives and institutional structures are extremely important for firm competitiveness. First, not every market flexes to an LME. The cases of India and Brazil demonstrate that the way they practice capitalism is completely different, resulting in completely different outcomes when compared to each other and South Korea, which VoC claims is a CME. OMGs, such as India, may still benefit from labor cost arbitrage in low-cost manufacturing in the near future, but their institutions lack the same level of coordination as a CME to compete in incremental innovation (as in South Korea, where stakeholder bargaining reinforces complement structures). Furthermore, Brazil, which is more active in the manufacturing sector than India, maintains a mixed market vibe. Brazil doesn't have the LME or CME vibes that South Korea does, you know what I mean? The disparities between India and Brazil are a significant flex for both the VoC debate and the development political economy debate.
The vibes in India and Brazil are significant because they demonstrate how the VoC is impacting businesses and economic growth, you know?
.jpg)
Since liberalisation, the Indian economy has completely gone LME, whereas the Brazilian economy is still somewhat mixed, you know? Second, the level of development of a country is extremely important when considering a VoC approach, you know? Brazil's institutions are significantly more mature than India's because Brazil is far more advanced, you know? Brazil completely flexed its industrial game in the 1950s, and the vibe in Brazil is significantly higher than in India (World Bank 2013; Panagariya 2008; Baer 2008; Frankel 2005). Meanwhile, India is in the midst of its industrialization process while still dealing with extreme poverty. These differences influence how things run and how people negotiate. To be honest, Brazilian institutions have a much stronger capitalist vibe than Indian institutions. As a result, comparisons between India and Brazil must take into account a variety of factors. Third, firms, whether private or state-owned, fully embrace capitalism in the domestic political economy, you know? Firm-specific factors aren't typically considered in VoC, but this analysis completely connects microeconomic behavior to macroeconomic structures, ya know? While the firm is extremely important in VoC literature, the entire corporate governance issue is not thoroughly explored, ya know? However, corporate governance behavior is essentially the ultimate test of how long domestic market structures can survive. 'Because, in order to remain competitive, a company must stay on top of its game and respond to market trends. OMG, firm decisions are extremely important in the stakeholder bargaining process.
However, if a company does not adjust its corporate governance to match the demand structure of the domestic market, it will lose competitiveness. No cap.
.jpg)
Therefore corporate governance convergence at a firm level, within countries, is, like, a major discovery that gives us mad insight into how microeconomic players and macroeconomic systems are connected. In the Indian and Brazilian cases, I observe the corporate governance vibes of three companies that began with different corporate governance structures. In both case studies, firm corporate governance was completely on fleek and converged to a lit market typology, with India being all liberal vibes and Brazil being more of a mixed market vibe, you know? The important thing is that the convergence was not a state-linked or coordinated typology, you know? It was not your typical state-centered development state or export-oriented coordinated economy, fam. OMG, while the political and economic vibes of India and Brazil are somewhat similar, there are some significant differences in the typological trajectories, or complement structures, of these two markets. The differences between the two markets are similar to a major flex. National systems of capitalism are, like, a total vibe of the political and socioeconomic deals that are agreed upon by the domestic squad for economic interaction. Where both labor and capital markets be vibin' together, economic interests can set long-term goals and flex their asset-specific expertise that lead to mad firm skills in incremental innovation (i.e. fancy manufacturing). Where both labor and capital markets lack collective action, economic interests are all about short-term time horizons and being disruptive, you know? In between are systems where either cap or labor markets are lit with collective action while the other market is not.
Comments
Post a Comment