A liberal democracy can survive for a while on institutional strength and widespread agreement. As long as most people are generally satisfied with how things are going (or have made peace with the status quo), it is easy to imagine that something like a social contract will keep things on track. Hamish MacAuley makes a persuasive case that many Canadians came of age politically between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 2008 financial crisis, when consensus was widespread and politics seemed optional, thus many chose to stay out. We abandoned democratic governing habits during prosperous times. Instead, we played politics. In response, McGill's Jacob T. Levy advocates for political action that rejects the status quo while also refusing to burn it all down or take our ball and go home. We should participate in politics, even if it is unsatisfying. When the foundations of our democratic structure or the rights of vulnerable people are jeopardized, it makes sense to delegate aut
Like, basically, the facts show that companies aren't just like, totally made by super global markets. Firms can't just flex outside the structures and constraints of the domestic economy, ya know? Rather, firms be flexin' with their unique local vibes and swag. To like, give you some basic examples, Indian firms like totally leveled up in software management and pharmaceuticals, Brazil like killed it in banking, agriculture and commodities, and South Korea like slayed in electronics and automobiles - these differences would suggest India may have mad competitive advantages as an LME, South Korea as a CME, and Brazil as an MME. The variation, like, in a developmental context, is totally unexpected because all three countries were like going for state-based macroeconomic strategies to, like, stimulate the development of domestic manufacturing industries.
Of the only South Korea flexed global competitiveness in sophisticated manufacturing.
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The connection between firm competitiveness and VoC is, like, super important cuz it helps us understand where competitiveness comes from in EMs. And that, in turn, can either support or totally wreck the "development" policies that state-centric developing economies keep trying to put in place. The thesis gonna be like, yo, the vibes of firm success in the Indian and Brazilian market are all about the incentive sets faced by firms in the microeconomy, cuz of the diff vibes in each country's typological trajectory. I lowkey think India's economy is like all about that glow up state going towards an LME while Brazil's economy is like all about that glow up state mixed with an interventionist state, or MME. Indian IT firms were like, totally able to flex on those liberal market corporate governance norms before liberalisation and then they straight up leveled up their strengths after liberalisation. It's lit, fam! Like, these firms were totally able to innovate disruptively, ya know? In contrast, Brazilian banks totally flexed on the weak anti-trust enforcement and poor minority shareholder protections to build super conservative, protected, domestic businesses. No cap. The lack of innovative sectors originating in Brazil and state-influence would explain why banking is at the apex of domestic industry, ya know? Differences at the firm level are like, all about how people vibe and stuff. The thesis will flex how labor and capital markets have different vibes in each country. Brazilian labor markets are like, totally constitutionally codified with, like, highly specific corporatist foundations. It's, like, legit, you know? The pre-reqs for these laws to work, tho, are like, totally MIA.
Rather than flex with biz interests, sindicatos, if they're active, usually organize around strikes and/or political activism to make moves.
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The Indian case is like, hella relatable cuz labor movements are mad politicized and striking is, like, totally normal. But like, the real tea is that there's major differences when it comes to how flexible the job market is, ya know? Indian labour is like sooo scattered across, like, not just companies but also different states. It's like all over the place, you know? Indiv skills are like, super valued, cuz firms wanna hire the most talented peeps and like, train them. Unskilled labor, like, mostly does its thing in the informal economy cuz Indian labor laws are, like, super restrictive and ineffective, ya know? OMG, like, India is totally flexing by excluding certain sectors from those boring labour laws and they keep extending these chill amnesties to other sectors. So lit! Wyd both systems have like, super corporate vibes, but the way they do their thing is hella different. Differences in cap markets are hella pronounced. OMG, like, Brazil is lowkey the country that's fully flexin' its capital account, but India, with its semi-closed capital account, is straight up slayin' the game with its fire capital markets. BOVESPA, the main Brazilian stock exchange, is like, super concentrated among a few key firms and has, like, major issues with corporate governance standards (DiMiceli 2010a). India, like bruh, has two stock markets the size of BOVESPA and like many more regionally; and like, Indian stock markets are hella liquid, even more than U.S. markets when measured in transactions (Allen et al 2007). Indian laws and regulatory frameworks do a way better job ensuring rights for minority stakeholders and transparency, respectively. No cap. Bruh, the lack of solid minority shareholder protections due to trash laws and wack regulation is like the main issue with investing in Brazil.
It messes with both stocks and credit investments, fam.
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OMG, like, Brazilian bond markets are, like, so poorly structured and Brazilian banks only do short term lending (tenor less than three years) without government guarantees, ya know? (Lazzarini and Musacchio 2011; personal interviews). #facts The Brazilian dev bank totally rules the distribution of corporate credit (Lazzarini and Musacchio 2011). Otherwise, like, four major banks totally rule the consumer market. The Indian banking sector, like bruh, is hella fragmented (Mohan 2013). The state lowkey be involved but doesn't straight up control lending, ya know? Rather, the state is like, totally flexin' with 75% ownership of the banking sector, which helps SOEs but doesn't stop private sector banks from doin' their own credit thing (in Brazil, even private sector banks rely on state guarantees to make loans to companies, like, wild right?). The diffs across cap markets affect how firms finance and govern themselves. Furthermore, the thesis will flex that the vibe for change is also hella different across the two markets. OMG, like both had to get with the times after the IMF stepped in during the 90s, but the way they intervened in each market was totally different. SOEs provide a lit example of difference, fam. Brazilian SOEs are like the biggest flex in so many sectors, with Vale and Petrobras at the top of the game (Lazzarini 2011). India's SOEs, on the other hand, are like always getting outshined by private sector competitors (Mohan 2005). OMG, like so many sectors have mad SOEs (i.e. India doesn't even flex national)
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