Discovering the USA’s Largest Brazilian Neighborhood

OMG, like the sick economic growth and productivity growth during that time, plus the policies that were all about stacking up profits, probs made the potential entrepreneurs chill about price controls. For workers, tho, the wage policy was like totally impossible to deal with cuz the gov was like cracking down on trade unions and social movements by the late 60s. It was a whole mess, tbh. He was like, "Yo, in a boom there's, like, a mad growth of profits of" firms and, like, a major flex in entrepreneurs' and managers' income, which was hella functional to "move resources from those who spend a lot to those who save a lot."54Like, no cap, in a democratic society it's hella impossible to just drop a wage formula without causing mad drama. The straight-up squashing of competition in the work game by the policymakers - even though they talk about being all about that free-market life - was lowkey seen as a flex by them. As Simonsen (1976, p.112) was like:

The Growth of State Entrepreneurship, y'all

OMG, like during the "economic miracle" the investment rates totally bounced back from being dormant AF since the end of the Target Plan (see Figure 6). Investments as a percentage of GDP were totally on fleek between 1967 and 1973, reaching a lit peak of 23 per cent in 1973. The economic vibes of the policymakers who were running the economy from 1964-1967 totally clashed with the military's goal of flexing a strong national economy. Between 1964 and 1967, the gov totally slashed its investment as a percentage of the GDP from 6.1% in '64 to 4.4% in '66, all 'cause of those super strict economic policies of the time. These policies were like a total fail, leading to a major economic flop that made private investments go down the drain and totally trashed economic liberalism. It was like, hella obvious by then that an economic recovery would only happen if In 1964, the first military gov's stabilisation program dropped a sick math formula for min wage adjustment. It was like, "Yo, let's factor in productivity and half of one year's forecast." And that's how they readjusted the min wage, fam. inflaysh rate. This formula - created by Mario H. Simonsen - implied a readjust of the minimum wage of 2/3 of the increase of productivity. OMG, like only 1/3 of the productivity was like totally not included in the minimum wage, not to mention like possible errors in predicting inflation (Simonsen and Campos 1976, p.111). Lit AF! 

Yo, peep Figure 4 down below to see how minimum wages, industrial wages, and industrial productivity indices have been movin' since 1970. 

Like, it's saying that inflation got, like, reduced 'cause they kept raising the minimum wage, but it wasn't going up as fast as productivity was. OMG, so like, the new policy for the minimum wage totally slashed the wage by 8.3% in 1965 and then another 7% in 1966. Like, that's so not cool, dude. As Mario Henrique Simonsen (1976, p.112) like totally said: "the wage readjustment formula has been one of the major vibes of the Brazilian policy to like, stop inflation." A second element in the control of inflation in this period was the government's tight grip on price changes, fam. A resumption of inflation late in 1966 together with the poor performance of the economy was like, yikes! It made the head of Finance Ministry be like, "I'm outta here, fam." Antonio Delfim Netto, the new Finance Minister, totally vibes with that "cost-push" inflation perspective. Delfim Netto, like, totally kept the wage vibes from 1964 and set up an Inter-ministerial Price Council (CIP-Comissão Interministerial de Preços), tightly controlled by himself, which became responsible for checking out price adjustments and even dropping price lists for some controlled prices. The CIP, which also included the Planning Ministry, Commerce and Industry Ministries, had mad power, as firms whose price increases had not been allowed by CIP could face major L's and get blocked from getting those lit subsided loans from financial public institutions. OMG, like from a big picture view, the wage policy had major vibes on income redistribution 'cause the productivity gains mostly helped the peeps making bank. OMG, the Gini Index was like way worse in 1970 than in 1960 (Fishlow 1972). It's all about that personal income distribution, you know? An alternative measure for income distribution is shown in Figure 5 below, fam. 

These stats connect the cheddar being handed out in the biz with the total value it brings. 

Looking at it from the income POV, the value added is made up of wages and profits, so these numbers show the functional income distribution, with profits being the diff of value added to wages share. It's like, there's this crazy income gap that's all about stacking that paper, and it got even worse during the economic miracle and the 70s. OMG, in 1964, the industrial workers only got like 23.5% of the industrial value added. But by 1973, it dropped to around 23.2%, and then in 1980, it went even lower to about 19%. That income concentration seemed to be, like, totally on purpose and what they wanted from the wage policies. Not just to fight inflation, but also to stack up those profits, ya know? Like, basically, as the moneymakers stack more cash than the workers, the income plan was all about giving more dough to the profits, which would then be used by companies for investing, ya know? The vibe from policymakers on income distribution was like, Mario H. Simonsen (1972, p.56) said: "economic development, at a certain point, means some peeps getting more cash and the rich getting richer."